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1 Introduction
Until recently, most systems were operating over wired networks and were in-
tended to be used as part of speciﬁc applications or in localised settings (e.g.,
building, campus or corporation). Spurred by the emergence of Wiﬁ technolo-
gies and the advance of generalised eCommerce and pervasive applications
(e.g., rescue and military application), interest has moved towards the provi-
sion of a global solution that interconnects in a secure manner changing sets
of clients, services and networks. This construction of Internet-scale applica-
tions introduces new challenges consisting in securing large-scale networks,
including Wiﬁ-enabled ad hoc networks, which are spanning geographically
dispersed sites and distinct administrative domains. The traditional way of
protecting these networks and applications with e.g., ﬁrewalls and encryption
is no longer suﬃcient due to the following reasons. First, ad hoc networks intro-
duce security holes due to their vulnerability to a variety of factors e.g., open
medium, cooperative algorithms. In addition, the best protection is always
vulnerable to attacks due to unknown security bugs and improper conﬁgu-
ration. It is therefore clear that preventive measures should be coupled with
intrusion detection mechanisms so as to identify unauthorised use and abuse.
The Distributed Network Intrusion Detection Systems (DNIDSs) that have
been proposed in the literature [1] [2], are extremely diverse in the mecha-
nisms they employ to gather, analyse data and identify intrusion. However,
DNIDSs share in common the fact that they glean intrusion data by monitor-
ing the traﬃc and intercepting the network communications. More speciﬁcally,
they mostly operate on the IP and transport layer headers and packets as well
as the packet content, providing in depth packet analysis. Consequently, while
DNIDSs are in a very convenient position wherein it has a complete access to
all traﬃc traversing the managed network, their perspicacities suﬀer from:2 Francoise Sailhan, Julien Bourgeois, and Val´ erie Issarny
• the cost (in term of processing usage) associated with the in depth analysis
of the intercepted traﬃc. Note that one class of attacks commonly launched
against DNIDS, lies in letting this DNIDS in a lethal state by spamming
it with a large number of spurious traﬃc.
• the absence of information owned by the DNIDS on resources (hosts, ser-
vices, protocols and applications) that constitute the network, which ren-
ders the DNIDS impotent to detect, correlate and report a wide range of
(host, service, protocol and application-speciﬁc) intrusions.
This ineﬃciency of actual DNIDSs engaged us to propose a novel approach
to intrusion detection, which were based on a Distributed Security Operation
Center (DSOC)[6, 7]. Rather than relying exclusively on a resource-consuming
and prone to attack traﬃc monitoring system, our DSOC collects logs that are
generated by any application, service, DNIDS, layer of the protocol stack or
resource (e.g., router) composing the managed system. As a result, our DSOC
owns a global view of the supervised system - the state of any component
being reported - based on which it can detect complex intrusions that are
possibly originated by any component of the protocol/application stack and
any hardware resource.
Based on this preliminary work, we propose a novel Hybrid DSOC (HD-
SOC) which is dedicated to provide intrusion detection in large-scale net-
works including dispersed Wiﬁ-based ad hoc network. Our HDSOC takes into
account the speciﬁcities of ad hoc networks:
• Wireless hosts may operate under severe constraints e.g., limited band-
width. This requires deﬁning an HDSOC that reduces the overhead caused
by its usage.
• The dynamics of hybrid networks including ad hoc networks, diminish the
resilience of the HDSOC and necessitates to increase the decoupling of the
HDSOC components so as to enable this latter to react and reconﬁgure in
a timely way to network dynamics.
All these factors circumvent the need for supporting a global low-overhead
HDSOC that is adapted to the network topology and characteristics (e.g.,
its dynamics, organisation) as well as the medium of communication which
may be e.g., unreliable and subject to unexpected disconnection. In order to
increase the resilience of the HDSOC, we propose to (i) distribute its capabil-
ities and (ii) provide extensive coordination capabilities for guarantying that
both the networks and the HDSOC components do not constitute isolated en-
tities largely unaware of each others. The proposed security operation center
collects logs for detection and correlation without consuming signiﬁcant net-
work bandwidth while addressing missing, conﬂicting, bogus, and overlapping
data. Further support for dynamic reassign correlation, and intrusion detec-
tion management responsibilities is provided to nodes as the topology evolves.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. We introduce the pro-
posed Distributed Security Operation Center (§ 2) before detailing each of itsA Security Supervision System for Hybrid Networks 3
constitutive component (§ 3). Then, we conclude this paper with a summary
of our results along with directions for future works (§ 4).
2 Design Rational
HDSOC aims to detect intrusion in a hybrid network composed of a collection
of ad hoc networks which either (i) operate in physically isolated geographic
sites (e.g., disaster-aﬀected areas) or (ii) extend the coverage of e.g., public
hot-spots, corporate buildings or large-scale urban areas. Each of these geo-
graphically dispersed ad hoc networks is further connected to a (wired) wide
area network thanks to some gateway nodes (see Figure 1 for an overview of
the network and the HDSOC architecture).
Fig. 1. HDSOC Architecture
The main challenge in collecting logs in ad hoc networks stems from the
need to minimise the generated traﬃc and the computational load. This calls
for:
1. parsing logs (i.e., extract only relevant data) rather than collecting raw
logs that are characterised by a large size and prone to overload our system
(as it is the case with attacks on the log size),
2. enabling resource-constrained devices that are incapable of parsing locally
their logs, to delegate this parsing activity to a remote device which oﬀers
suﬃcient capabilities.4 Francoise Sailhan, Julien Bourgeois, and Val´ erie Issarny
3. parsing logs as close as close as possible from the device that generates it
so as to diminish the number of long distant communications.
In order to answer to these commitments, our approach lies in collecting and
parsing logs locally whenever possible. For this purpose, a lightweight col-
lector and parsing agent (hereafter referred as Embedded Collection Box or
simply ECBox) is embedded on the devices that show suﬃcient memory and
computing resources. Alternatively, for resource-constrained nodes, we rely
on a service discovery protocol (§3.4), which discovers dynamically ECBoxes.
Among potential candidates, the closest ECBox is selected so as to keep to
a minimum long distance communication. The selected ECBox is further as-
signed the task of collecting and parsing logs on behalf of resource-constrained
devices. After parsing and extracting relevant data from logs, local/remote
ECBoxes generate event notiﬁcations that are further disseminated over the
network, causing a slight increase of the network traﬃc due to the lightweight
size of event notiﬁcations. The dissemination of events is performed by an
event notiﬁcation service which aims to ensure that each device is delivered
the information (i.e., events) relating to the distributed intrusion to which
that devices participates. This information gives to the device a global view
of the intrusion (i.e., intrusion state, intrusion development and its level of
implication), helping it in reporting in early stage any intrusion furtherance.
In order to prevent the device from ﬂooding the network whenever an intru-
sion is reported while providing to the devices a global view of the intrusion
attempts to which it takes part, we rely on a publish/subscribe distributed
event notiﬁcation service whereby:
• consumers (e.g., devices taking part in the intrusion attempt, security ad-
ministrator’s computer) express their demands to producers (e.g., devices
taking part in the intrusion) during a subscription process,
• event producers transfer to subscribers the description of any relevant
event that has been triggered locally.
This event system faces the requirements (namely scalability, autonomy and
timeliness) driven by HDSOC by disseminating in a distributed way events
over a self-conﬁgured delivery structure organised as a cluster-based hierar-
chy (Figure 4). This cluster-based hierarchy provides convenient aggregation
and correlation points while rending our HDSOC more adaptable to network
failures and less vulnerable to attacks due to its distributed nature.
3 Distributed Operation Center for Hybrid Networks
We propose an hybrid distributed security operation center which aims to
detect intrusions within a large-scale network including dispersed ad hoc net-
works. Such detection necessitates to collect logs (§3.1) so as to identify in-
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bandwidth-consuming raw logs, our approach lies in parsing logs so as to
extract only security-relevant information and generate compact event notiﬁ-
cations and alarms that are beside disseminated at low cost (§ 3.3). Note that
such parsing is either performed locally, i.e., on the device that generated the
logs if its capacities are suﬃcient) or alternatively remotely; such delegation
of the parsing task being enabled by a pervasive service discovery protocol (§
3.4).
3.1 Local Event Collection
Prior developing mechanisms for detecting intruders, it is crucial to under-
stand the nature of attacks3 as well as the possible security holes that char-
acterise ad hoc and hybrid networks. In ad hoc networks, intruders take ad-
vantage of the lack of physical protection inherent to the absence of clear
physical boundary (no protection being applied inside the network by any
layer 3 resources, e.g., gateways), the collaborative nature of algorithms and
the resource-limited capacity of the network (devices being more likely to be
exhausted). This renders network components particularly vulnerable. These
components include:
• Networking components (e.g., MAC, zeroconf and routing protocols) in-
cluded in the physical/link/network layers are subject to eavesdropping,
jamming, interceptions (physical layer), identity falsiﬁcation (zeroconf pro-
tocol) and ﬁnally attacks initiated on routing tables (routing protocol)
with e.g., the so-called wormhole and blackhole attacks.
• Security components, including DNIDS, cryptographic facilities, motiva-
tion functionalities which recompense collaborative nodes, and reputation
and exclusion mechanisms whereby nodes vote and attribute a reputation
to each node.
• Transport components, applications and services which are aﬀected by
session hijacking or ﬂooding and application/service/scenario-speciﬁc at-
tacks.
Each of these software components generates logs expressed in diﬀerent for-
mats including standard formats (e.g., syslog, MIB, HTML) or proprietary/application-
speciﬁc formats. These logs can be easily collected relying on standard Xmit
protocols (e.g., SNMP, SMTP, HTTP) as it is the case in traditional monitor-
ing architectures. For instance, OLSR [5, 4] logs can be collected using MIB
format that is deﬁned and used in [8, 9]. The pervasiveness of these protocols
ensures a signiﬁcant level of interoperability to our HDSOC despite the hetero-
geneity of hardware and software platforms. We therefore consider a HDSOC
in which each device generates logs whose collection is enabled thanks to a
protocol agent. In practice, this protocol agent corresponds to a collection of
clients which implement standard Xmit protocols (Figure 2). Collecting logs
3 Interest reader can refer to [12] for a comprehensive survey on attacks and coun-
termeasures in ad hoc networks.6 Francoise Sailhan, Julien Bourgeois, and Val´ erie Issarny
Fig. 2. Device Architecture
from heterogeneous sources implies setting up a dispatcher and an application
agent. The dispatcher determines the source-type of an incoming event and
then forward it to the appropriate application agent which formats it in a
common format (i.e., a format understandable by any HDSOC module). In
practice, this dispatcher performs the following tasks:
• listening for incoming message transmitted by a protocol agent through an
particular channel (e.g., as socket, named pipe, system V message queue),
• identifying the message source and the Xmit protocol used. More precisely,
a patterns database is pre-loaded in the device memory (for performance
considerations) and is used to ﬁnd patterns matching the message.
• redirecting the original message to the application agent responsible for
managing the messages generated by that type of source and Xmit proto-
col.
This application agent parses the message and expresses it in a common format
that is transmitted to the event notiﬁcation agent.
3.2 Distributed Intrusion detection
After translating events into a common format that is understandable by any
DSOC component, events are analysed and correlated so as to avoid transmit-A Security Supervision System for Hybrid Networks 7
ting all the events across the network. The main objective of correlation lies in
producing a succinct overview of security-related activities. This necessitates
to (i) ﬁlter events for the purpose of extracting only relevant events, and (ii)
aggregate events so as to generate a compact representation of those events
that eases the intrusion detection. Broadly sketched, event ﬁltering aims to
eliminate events that are not relevant, i.e.,
• duplicate events that do not provide additional information while consum-
ing signiﬁcant bandwidth.
• events that match policy criteria e.g., administrator login, identiﬁcation,
authorisation or restriction processes.
• events that are not critical to the supervised system, excluding events that
relate to some vulnerabilities whose system is not exposed to. For this pur-
pose, the device stores and maintains (structural, functional and topology-
related) information about security breaches and insecure behaviour that
either impact the overall security level or that can be exploited by an
attacker.
Relevant events (i.e., events that went thought the ﬁltering pipe) are further
aggregated so as to provide a more concise view of what is happening in the
system. This actual system view called context is stored locally with the pre-
viously generated contexts, before being transmitted by the event notiﬁcation
service. Based on the collection of contexts owned by the device, intrusion
detection may take place. Intrusion detection consists in analysing a sequence
of events so as to identify event sequence patterns characterising intrusion
attempt. Note that during this process, time considerations are taken into
account so as to take into account slow intrusions. In practice, such intrusion
detection consists in matching a sequence of events (a context) against a set
of attack signatures whose structure is described bellow.
Attack signature
A conquering attack can be broken down into a collection of successive steps
that are successfully completed. This renders an attack characterisable as an
attack signature, which corresponds to a labelled tree rooted by a node repre-
senting the goal, and intermediate nodes representing an attack step (i.e., an
observable event) with a succession of children deﬁning a way of achieving it.
An attack scenario (i.e., the overall set of attacks that can threat the super-
vised system) is then represented as a forest of trees, with some part of trees
being shared when a subset of steps involved in two distinct attacks is simi-
lar. Such attack scenarios are deﬁned by the security administrator based on
vulnerabilities speciﬁc to the network and the past attacks. Such tree-based
representation of attack signatures renders intrusion detection easy to carry
out. Indeed, an attack attempt is easily identiﬁable by matching attack sig-
natures against a context, i.e., against a succession of (possibly distributed)
events occurring on a speciﬁc set of systems (e.g. devices, collection of devices,8 Francoise Sailhan, Julien Bourgeois, and Val´ erie Issarny
network segments). From a practical point of view, an attack identiﬁcation
therefore consists in matching an attack signature on the instance of a par-
ticular context. Central to intrusion identiﬁcation is therefore the context
accuracy. This accuracy is maintained by the event notiﬁcation service, which
updates the context of each device (its system view) with the most up-to-date
events arising in the network.
3.3 Distributed Event Notiﬁcation
Our event notiﬁcation service aims to deliver events to devices so as to enable
them to update their context, giving that device a global view of the intru-
sion attempts and hence rending the detection of intrusions more accurate.
In order to prevent the device from blindly ﬂooding the network whenever
an intrusion is reported, our event model derives from the asynchronous pub-
lish/subscribe paradigm. From a communication perspective, our distributed
event notiﬁcation consists in exchanging notiﬁcations and control messages
(i.e., subscriptions and un-subscriptions) between producers and subscribers
through a collection of intermediate event agents (Figure 1). Note that a po-
tential event agent (hereafter simply called agent) designates a device which
holds our notiﬁcation service. In practice, this collection of intermediate agents
is organised into a cluster-based structure wherein each agent corresponds is
a cluster leader and maintains information and connectivity with its cluster
members and its clusterhead4 . This underlying structure is then used for de-
livering control messages (subscriptions and un-subscriptions) to producers,
as well as notiﬁcations to consumers. When delivering a notiﬁcation, the main
objective pursued by agents lies in forwarding that notiﬁcation to an agent
only if, toward this direction, there exists a consumer interested in receiving
it. For the purpose of forwarding selectively notiﬁcations, each agent holds a
subscription repository that includes each received subscription along with the
respective neighbouring agent which forwarded it. Note that a neighbouring
router constitutes the potential candidate for forwarding notiﬁcations. This
repository is used to deﬁne if there exists a consumer along the direction
of the considered router that subscribed for this notiﬁcation. Based on this
event notiﬁcation, security information can be eﬃciently disseminated to the
HDSOC.
Event notiﬁcation Delivery Structure
In order to support an eﬃcient event dissemination over a hybrid network, we
propose a distributed event system, which distinguishes itself by:
• providing seamless integrated event notiﬁcation over a network com-
posed of diﬀerent types of networking technologies (wired versus wire-
4 The root of the delivery structure maintains information restricted to its cluster
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less, infrastructure-less versus infrastructure-based networks) and possibly
spanning geographically dispersed domains/sites.
• addressing the problem relating to the support of extensive control, se-
curity and autonomy by mean of a distributed event notiﬁcation system
based on a overlay infrastructure, which organise the nodes for delivering
event notiﬁcations.
In Practice, in order to distribute the events management, we based our event
notiﬁcation system on a distributed grouping communication which organises
nodes into a self-organised delivery structure (Figure 4) deployed of the hy-
brid network, as deﬁned in [3]. This structure corresponds to a cluster-based
hierarchy of nL layers (nL=log(nn), with nn designating the number of nodes
that are expected to join the event system), each layer being portioned into a
set of bounded-size clusters (let k be that size) controlled by a cluster head.
The reason for setting bounds on the number of layers and on the cluster size
is twofold. First, it ensures a control overhead ranging about log(nn) at each
node. Second, the length of the path used for delivering notiﬁcations, and
hence the related delay, is bounded (o log(nn)). In order to prevent a cluster
of size k from changing continuously its conﬁguration whenever it gains or
looses a member, the admitted bounded-size of a cluster ranges from k up to
2k cluster members. In practice, to warrant a loop-free structure, each node
belongs to the lowest layer (L0) and only the leader of cluster located in a
layer Li belongs to the upper layer Li+1. This delivery structure is created
Layer L 0
Layer L 1
Layer L
2 B
A
A C
A B C
A
Layer L
3
Cluster
Logical topology
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and maintained by a grouping solution. Considering the fact that there exists
no unique grouping protocol that is optimal for any kind of network, we use
a specialised grouping solutions for each type of network along with a mech-
anism for integrating them. We rely on the Nice protocol [3] which has been
speciﬁcally designed for operating in infrastructure-based large-scale network
(e.g., the Internet) and the Madeira protocol that comes from our previous
research on network management [10] and is customised to operating over ad
hoc networks. The reason that motivates our choice for the Nice protocol, is
twofold. First, this application-level protocol can operate over a large-scale
network spanning diﬀerent administrative domains. In addition, it were origi-
nally developed to support video streaming and hence meets the requirements
driven by real-time delivery.
For scalability reasons, a node does not manage information concerning
the overall group. Instead, a member or cluster head maintains information
restricted to its cluster(s); each member sending periodically a keep-alive mes-
sage. This limited knowledge permits to keep to a minimum the number of
control messages exchanged for maintaining up-to-date membership informa-
tion.
3.4 Distributed Service Discovery
The resource constraints of networked devices (e.g., routers, or devices be-
longing to ad hoc networks) coupled with the ﬁnancial cost inherent to the
deployment of additional functionalities on devices, circumvents the need for
enabling HDSOC to delegate to remote devices a part of the functionalities
relating to intrusion detection, e.g., log parsing and signature matching. The
eﬀective delegation of these functionalities, which are traditionally performed
by ECBoxes, necessitates to discover on the ﬂy the service(s) oﬀered in the
network that best match(es) these functionalities requirements. The following
introduces a service discovery protocol [11] that meets this requirement. This
protocol is aimed at hybrid networks including ad hoc networks. In the ad
hoc network, our primary goal is to keep to a minimum the traﬃc generated
by the service discovery process, so as to minimise consumption of resources
and in particular energy. Speciﬁcally, our discovery architecture is structured
around a subset of HDSOC nodes, called lookup agents or simply agents,
that are responsible for discovering ECBox functionalities and capabilities.
These lookup agents are deployed so that at least one lookup agent is reach-
able in at most a ﬁxed number of hops, H, whose value is dependent upon
the nodes density. Agents cache the descriptions of ECBoxes’ functionalities
(services) available in their vicinity which is deﬁned by H. Hence, HDSOC
nodes (excluding lookup agents) do not have to maintain a cache of service
descriptions, and the network is not ﬂooded by service advertisements. A
resource-constrained HDSOC device looking for a service (i.e., an ECBox or
one of its embedded functionality), simply sends a query to the lookup agent
for local service discovery. If the description of the requested service is notA Security Supervision System for Hybrid Networks 11
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Fig. 4. Discovery Structure
cached by the local agent, this agent selectively forwards the query to other
lookup agents so as to perform global discovery. The selection of the lookup
agents toward which service queries are forwarded, is based on the exchange
of proﬁles among agents. The agent proﬁle provides a compact summary of
the agent’s content and a characterisation of the host capacity. Agent pro-
ﬁles allow both guaranteeing that service queries are issued to agents that
are likely to cache the description of the requested service and to keep to a
minimum the generated traﬃc. Another critical issue lies in providing conve-
nient features so as to enable discovery of services over the hybrid network.
This is supported through gateways that (i) advertise their capabilities (e.g.,
with a related gateway protocol, a zeroconf protocol, or using our protocol),
and (ii) are assigned a local or remote lookup agent, implementing the co-
operative behaviour as discussed above. A gateway lookup agent then holds
the description of services available in all the networks composing the hybrid
network, and advertises itself to the networks it bridges composing the hybrid
network. Furthermore, to support service discovery in an infrastructure-based
network in which a network administrator deploys agents, clients and service
providers behave diﬀerently. Since clients and service providers do not need to
elect a agents, they can listen for agents announcements or rely on the DHCP
protocol.
Using this service discovery protocol, a resource-constrained DHSOC de-
vice can delegate to a remote device the resource-consuming functionalities
that implement intrusion detection. For this purpose, it discovers dynami-12 Francoise Sailhan, Julien Bourgeois, and Val´ erie Issarny
cally the ECBoxes, located within the overall hybrid network, which oﬀer the
functionalities that best match its requirements. Then, it cooperates with the
selected ECBoxe’s service, utilising the provided service description, so as to
contribute to the global eﬀort for detecting intrusions.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a Hybrid Distributed Security Operation Center
(HDSOC) which collects logs that are generated by any application/service,
layer of the protocol stack or resource (e.g., router), providing a global view of
the supervised system based on which it complex and distributed intrusions
can be detected. Rather than directly transmitting these logs over the network,
causing its overload, logs are parsed in an early stage so as to easily extract
intrusion-related information and distribute it by the mean of compact event
notiﬁcations and alarms. This HDSOC couples a lightweight distributed intru-
sion detection components with a distributed event system and a distributed
service discovery protocol for an eﬃcient delegation of resource-consuming
tasks and a bandwidth-saving cluster-based collection of the events across the
hybrid network. Our Hybrid Distributed Security Operation Center further
addresses the main commitments of hybrid networks: scalability, ﬂexibility,
autonomy, and fault-tolerance. More precisely,
• Scalability comes from the distribution of load relating to the log parsing
and the intrusion detection, on the devices
• Autonomy is the consequence of using a group based event notiﬁcation
service and a discovery protocol that are (i) automatically deployed with-
out requiring human intervention and (ii) adapt dynamically to network
changes (e.g., topology changes).
• Fault-tolerance is attributed to (i) a loosely-distributed event delivery that
adapts dynamically to any permanent or transient network failure and a
service discovery protocol that permits to discover dynamically an alter-
native to a faulty service.
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